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Abstract
This paper provides a complete solution to the question of the existence of equilibria in
games with general strategy spaces that may be discrete, continuum or non-convex and payoff
functions that may be discontinuous or do not have any form of quasi-concavity. We establish
a single condition, called recursive diagonal transfer continuity, which is both necessary and
sufﬁcient for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with arbitrary compact
strategy spaces and payoffs. As such, our result strictly generalizes all the existing results
on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, recursive diagonal transfer
continuity also permits full characterization of symmetric, mixed strategy, and Bayesian Nash
equilibria in games with general strategy spaces and payoffs. The approach and main result
developed in the paper can also allow us to ascertain the existence of equilibria in impor-
tant classes of economic games. As an illustration, we show how they can be employed to
fully characterize the existence of competitive equilibrium for economies with excess demand
functions. The method of proof adopted to obtain our main result is also new and elementary
— a non-ﬁxed-point-theorem approach.
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11 Introduction
The notion of Nash equilibrium introduced by Nash (1950, 1951) is probably one of the most
important solution concepts in game theory that has wide applications in almost all areas in eco-
nomics. The early theorems of Nash (1950, 1951), Debreu (1952), and Fan (1953) reveal that
gamespossessapurestrategyNashequilibriumif(1)thestrategyspacesarenonempty, convexand
compact, and (2) players have continuous and quasiconcave payoff functions. The theorems say
nothing about equilibrium in games with discontinuous and/or non-quasiconcave payoffs. Glicks-
berg (1952) shows that games with compact Hausdorff strategy spaces and continuous payoffs
possess mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
Many economic models such as the classic price competition models of Bertrand (1883),
Hotelling (1929), and auction models such as the one in Milgrom and Weber (1982), patent
race models of Fudenberg et al. (1983), etc., however, frequently exhibit discontinuities or non-
quasiconcavity in payoffs. Consequently, the standard theorems cannot be applied to establishing
the existence of a pure or mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. While in many of these games equi-
libria can be constructed, there are other models in which this is not the case. Indeed, even for
multi-dimensional auction models, the existence of an equilibrium in this type of games has been
at issue since payoffs are not continuous, see Jackson (2005). Also, many economic models do not
have convex strategy spaces, and payoff functions under consideration may not be quasiconcave
or even do not have any form of quasi-concavity.
Accordingly, economists have been struggling to seek weaker conditions that can still guar-
antee the existence of an equilibrium. So far, two approaches have been adopted to weaken the
continuity and/or quasiconcavity. The ﬁrst approach is to relax the quasi-concavity of payoffs and
convexity of strategy spaces. In a homogeneous product setting McManus (1964) and Roberts and
Sonnenschein (1976) show the existence of a symmetric Cournot equilibrium allowing for a gen-
eral downward sloping demand when there are n identical ﬁrms with convex costs. Nishimura and
Friedman(1981)assume, inadditiontosomeconditionsonbestreplycorrespondences, thatpayoff
functions are continuous. Topkis (1979), Vives (1990), and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) establish
the existence in games where payoffs are upper semi-continuous and satisfy certain monotonicity
properties.
The central idea of this approach is based upon lattice-theoretical concepts, and at its heart lies
Tarski’s (1955) ﬁxed point theorem. An advantage of Vives’ approach is that it does not require
the convexity of strategy sets. Payoffs need not be quasiconcave in all of the papers mentioned
above, and additionally payoffs need not be continuous in some of them. The key property is that
best-replies are increasing in the opponents’ strategies, which guarantees the existence of pure
2strategy Nash equilibrium. However, the lattice-theoretic approach requires payoff functions must
be upper semi-continuous in one’s own strategy in order to guarantee the existence of best replies.
This assumption fails to hold in virtually all auctions, as well as in the classic games of Bertrand
and Hotelling.
The second approach is the topological approach proposed to weaken the continuity of pay-
off functions. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) are the ﬁrst to establish an existence theorem valid
for games with discontinuous payoff functions. Their results reveal that such games possess a
pure strategy equilibrium, provided (1) the strategy spaces are nonempty, convex and compact,
and (2) players have payoff functions that are quasiconcave, upper semi-continuous, and graph
continuous. They also investigate the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in games with
discontinuous payoffs.
Simon (1987) obtains the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous games
through introducing the notion of reciprocal upper semi-continuity (under the name of “comple-
mentary discontinuities”) and thus strictly generalizes the result of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986).
Reciprocal upper semi-continuity requires that some player’s payoff jump up whenever some other
player’s payoff jumps down, which generalizes the condition that the sum of the players’ payoffs
is upper semicontinuous.
Simon and Zame (1990) establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies with
an endogenous sharing rule. While in some settings involving discontinuities this approach is
remarkably helpful, in others it is less so. In an auction design environment where discontinuities
are sometimes deliberately introduced, the participants must be presented with a game that fully
describes the strategies and payoffs, since one cannot leave some of the payoffs unspeciﬁed or
somehow endogenously determined. In addition, this method is only useful in establishing the
existence of a mixed, as opposed to pure, strategy equilibrium.
Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) investigate the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium and
dominant-strategy equilibrium by weakening both continuity and quasi-concavity of payoffs. It
is shown that diagonal transfer quasi-concavity is necessary, and further, under diagonal transfer
continuity and compactness, sufﬁcient for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Both
diagonal transfer quasi-concavity and diagonal transfer continuity are very weak notions of quasi-
concavity and continuity, which adopt a basic idea of transferring a set of strategy proﬁle(s) to
another set of strategy proﬁle(s).
Reny(1999)establishestheexistenceofNashequilibriumincompactandquasiconcavegames
that are better-reply secure, which is also a weak notion of continuity. Reny (1999) shows that
better-reply security can be imposed separately as reciprocal upper semi-continuity introduced by
3Simon (1987) and payoff security. Bagh and Jofre (2006) further weaken reciprocal upper semi-
continuity to weak reciprocal upper semi-continuity and show that it, together with payoff security,
implies better-reply security. Both better-reply security and payoff security use a similar idea of
transferring a (non-equilibrium) strategy to a securing strategy, and therefore they are also in the
form of transfer continuity.
Nessah and Tian (2008) introduce an even weaker form of continuity, called weak transfer
quasi-continuity, whichisweakerthandiagonaltransfercontinuityinBaye, Tian, andZhou(1993)
and better-reply security in Reny (1999), and holds in a large class of discontinuous games. They
show that weak transfer quasi-continuity, together with the compactness of strategy spaces and
quasiconcavity or (strong/weak) diagonal transfer quasiconcavity of payoffs, permits the existence
of pure strategy Nash equilibrium so that it strictly generalizes the results of Baye, Tian, and
Zhou (1993) and Reny (1999). They provide some sufﬁcient conditions for weak transfer quasi-
continuity by introducing notions of weak transfer continuity, weak transfer upper continuity and
weak transfer lower continuity. These conditions are satisﬁed in many economic games and are
often quite simple to check. They also study the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in
discontinuous and nonconvex games.
Recently, Barelli and Soza (2009) further signiﬁcantly weaken the continuity and quasiconcav-
ity conditions. They generalize most existing results and establish the existence of pure strategy
Nash equilibria in discontinuous quasiconcave games and qualitative convex games.
However, all the existing results only give sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of equilib-
rium, and no full characterization has been given yet in the literature.1 The existing results use
two separated conditions: continuity and quasi-concavity/monotonicity. Neither single uniﬁed
condition nor full characterization approach has been given. A question is then whether or not
there exists a single uniﬁed condition that can be used to prove the existence of (pure/mixed) Nash
equilibrium in games with arbitrary strategy spaces and payoff functions, and if so, what the weak-
est condition is. This paper provides a complete answer to these questions by giving a necessary
and sufﬁcient condition for the existence of equilibrium in games with arbitrary strategy spaces
and payoffs.
This paper fully characterizes the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with
general topological strategy spaces that may be discrete, continuum or non-convex and payoff
functions that may be discontinuous or do not have any form of quasi-concavity. It is shown that
the condition, recursive (or called sequential) diagonal transfer continuity introduced in the pa-
1In the mechanism design literature, a lot of studies on full characterizations of Nash implementation of a social
choice correspondence have been given such as those in Maskin (1999), Moore and Repullo (1990), Dutta and Sen
(1991), etc. Also, Rahman (2008) recently provides a full characterization of correlated equilibrium.
4per, is necessary and sufﬁcient for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with
arbitrary compact strategy spaces and payoff functions. As such, it strictly generalizes all the ex-
isting theorems on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Recursive diagonal transfer
continuity deﬁned on respective spaces also permits full characterization of symmetric pure strat-
egy, mixed strategy Nash, and Bayesian Nash equilibria in games with general strategy spaces and
payoffs. Our full characterization result provides not only a way of understanding equilibrium,
but also a way of checking the existence/nonexistence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games
with discontinuous or nonconcave payoffs. We use quite a few known examples to illustrate the
usefulness of our main theorem, especially its usefulness in checking the nonexistence of equi-
librium. The approach and main result developed in the paper can also allow us to ascertain the
existence of equilibria in important classes of economic games. As an application, we show how
they can be employed to fully characterize the existence of competitive equilibrium with excess
demand functions.
The logic of recursive diagonal transfer continuity, which generalizes the notion of “diagonal
transfer continuity” to allow for recursive dominance (sequential security) , can be roughly de-
scribed as follows. Whenever a proﬁle of strategies is not an equilibrium, there is a strategy proﬁle
that will be transferred to any ﬁnite set of “sequential securing strategies”, each of which upsets
deviation strategy proﬁles uniformly and locally. This means whenever a strategy proﬁle x is not
an equilibrium, there is a deviation strategy proﬁle y and an open set of candidate strategy proﬁles
containing x, all of which are dominated by any recursive deviation (sequential securing) strategy
proﬁles that directly or indirectly dominates y.
The relation of the recursive diagonal transfer continuity and diagonal transfer continuity is
somewhat similar to that of the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) and strong axiom
of revealed preference (SARP) in the revealed preference theory on the rational behavior of indi-
vidual decision making. Directly revealing a preference by WARP is not enough to fully reveal
individuals’ preferences, and then one may use SARP – recursive sequences of indirect revealed
preferences (transitive closure) to fully reveal the rational behavior. Similarly, diagonal transfer
continuity or better-reply security alone is not enough to guarantee the existence of Nash equilib-
rium -a description of rational behavior of individuals’ strategic decision making, one then may
need to use recursive diagonal transfer continuity to fully characterize the existence of equilibrium.
The method of proof employed to obtain our main result is new. While there are different ways
of establishing the existence of Nash equilibria, all the existing proofs use the ﬁxed-point-theorem
related approaches. As such, previous techniques fail for two reasons. First, all the approaches in
the literature either use two types of conditions: continuity and quasi-convexity, or only provide
5sufﬁcient conditions to guarantee the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The presence
of discontinuity and non-quasi-concavity in payoffs may preclude the existence of best replies so
that best reply correspondences need not be nonempty-valued or convex-valued. Consequently,
both lattice-theoretical techniques and topological techniques (standard application of Kakutani’s
ﬁxed point theorem) to best reply correspondences fail. Second, to weaken the continuity, and
thus, to obtain the existence of an equilibrium, the existing approaches have only considered a
direct deviation from a non-equilibrium strategy. Moreover, a remarkable advantage of our proof
is that it is simple and elementary without using advanced math.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the notation, and pro-
vides a number of preliminary deﬁnitions used in our study of noncooperative games, including
the deﬁnition of the aggregate function that underlies our analysis of noncooperative games. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the new condition, recursive diagonal transfer continuity, which is used in our
full characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We prove our main result that recursive di-
agonal transfer continuity is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the existence of pure strategy
Nash equilibrium for arbitrary strategy spaces and payoffs. We also provide sufﬁcient conditions
for recursive diagonal transfer continuity to be true. Section 4 extends the full characterization
result to symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Section 5 fully characterizes the existence of
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in games with arbitrary strategy spaces and payoffs. Section 6
shows recursive diagonal transfer continuity is also a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the
existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in games. Section 7 shows how our main result can be
employed to fully characterize the existence of competitive equilibrium for economies with excess
demand functions. Finally, concluding remarks are offered in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
Consider the following noncooperative game in the normal form:
G = (Xi; ui)i2I (1)
where I = f1;:::;ng is the ﬁnite set of players,2 Xi is player i’s strategy space which is a
nonempty subset of a topological space Ei, and ui : X ¡! R is the payoff function of player i.
Denote by X =
Q
i2I
Xi the Cartesian product of the sets of strategy proﬁles of the game. For each




Cartesian product of the sets of strategies of players ¡i.
2All the results in the paper hold for a countable inﬁnity of players.
6A strategy proﬁle x¤ 2 X is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a game G if,
ui(yi;x¤
¡i) · ui(x¤) 8i 2 I; 8yi 2 Xi:
A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is compact, convex, bounded, and upper (lower) semi-continuous if,
for all i 2 I, Xi is compact, convex, and ui is bounded and upper (lower) semi-continuous on X,
respectively. A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is quasiconcave if, for every i 2 I, Xi is convex and the
function ui is quasiconcave in xi.
To fully characterize the existence of equilibria, our strategy is to consider a mapping of indi-
vidual payoffs into an aggregator function, and then provide a condition on the aggregator func-
tion that guarantees the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This kind of approach is
pioneered by Nikaido and Isoda (1955), and is also used by Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993). Das-
gupta and Maskin (1986) also use a similar approach to prove the existence of mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions.
Our full characterization of pure strategyNash equilibrium is based on the aggregator function,




ui(yi;x¡i); 8(x;y) 2 X £ X; (2)
which refers to the aggregate payoff across individuals where for every player i assuming she or
he deviates to yi given that all other players follow the strategy proﬁle x. We may call U(y;x)
the virtual deviation aggregate payoff, which may not be realizable. Immediately, we have the
following observation.
LEMMA 2.1 x¤2X is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a game G if and only if U(y;x¤) ·
U(x¤;x¤) for all y 2 X.
Proof: Suppose U(y;x¤) · U(x¤;x¤) for all y 2 X. Let y = (yi;x¤
¡i). We then have
ui(yi;x¤
¡i) · ui(x¤) 8 yi 2 X; (3)
which means that x¤ is a Nash equilibrium. The converse is obvious by summing up (3) for all
players.




2iui(yi;x¡i). This is a more
general formulation.
73 Full Characterization of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
In this section we provide a complete solution to the question of the existence of pure strategy
Nash equilibrium in games with arbitrary compact strategy spaces and payoffs by providing a
necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
3.1 Main Result
We begin with stating diagonal transfer continuity introduced by Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993)
since the notion of recursive diagonal transfer continuity is somewhat an extension of diagonal
transfer continuity.
DEFINITION 3.1 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is diagonally transfer continuous if, whenever
U(y;x) > U(x;x) for x;y 2 X, there exists a deviation strategy proﬁle z 2 X and a neigh-
borhood Vx ½ X of x such that U(z;x0) > U(x0;x0) for all x0 2 Vx.
Note that “U(y;x) > U(x;x) for x;y 2 X” means “x 2 X is not an equilibrium”. We
will use these terms interchangeably. We say that a strategy proﬁle y upsets strategy proﬁle x if
U(y;x) > U(x;x). Also, since the deviation strategy proﬁle z results in a strictly higher payoff
in a neighborhood of x, we call such a deviation strategy proﬁle z a securing strategy proﬁle. The
diagonal transfer continuity then simply means that, whenever x is not an equilibrium, there exists
a securing strategy proﬁle z that upsets all points in some neighborhood of x. For convenience of
exposition, let U(z;Vx) > U(Vx;Vx) denote U(z;x0) > U(x0;x0) for all x0 2 Vx, where Vx is a
neighborhood of x.
DEFINITION 3.2 (Recursive Upsetting) A strategy proﬁle y0 2 X is said to be recursively
(or called sequentially) upset by z 2 X if there exists a ﬁnite set of deviation strategy pro-
ﬁles fy1;y2;:::;ym¡1;zg such that U(y1;y0) > U(y0;y0), U(y2;y1) > U(y1;y1), :::,
U(z;ym¡1) > U(ym¡1;ym¡1).
We say that a strategy proﬁle y0 2 X is m-recursively upset by z 2 X if the number of
such deviation strategy proﬁles is m. For convenience, we say y0 is directly upset by z when
m = 1, and indirectly upset by z when m > 1. Recursive upsetting says that a strategy proﬁle
y0 can be directly or indirectly upset by a strategy proﬁle z through sequential deviation strategy
proﬁles fy1;y2;:::;ym¡1g in a recursive way that y0 is upset by y1, y1 is upset by y2, :::, and
ym¡1 is upset by z. The assertion that y0 is directly upset by z is a dominance relation that the
virtual aggregate payoff with individuals’ deviation exceeds the realizable total payoff for a given
8strategy proﬁle y0. Then the recursive upsetting says this dominance holds for any ﬁnite sequence
of strategy proﬁles originated from a given strategy point.
We are now ready to introduce the notion of recursive diagonal transfer continuity.
DEFINITION 3.3 (Recursive Diagonal Transfer Continuity) A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said
to be recursively (or called sequentially) diagonal transfer continuous if, whenever U(y;x) >
U(x;x) for x;y 2 X, there exists a strategy proﬁle y0 2 X (possibly y0 = x) and a neighborhood
Vx of x such that U(z;Vx) > U(Vx;Vx) for any z that recursively upsets y0.
Similarly, we can deﬁne m-recursive diagonal transfer continuity. A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I
is m-recursively diagonal transfer continuous if the phrase “for any z that recursively upsets y0”
in the above deﬁnition is replaced by “for any z that m-recursively upsets y0”. Thus, a game
G = (Xi; ui)i2I is recursively diagonal transfer continuous if it is m-recursively diagonal transfer
continuous on X for all m = 1;2:::.
REMARK 3.1 Under recursive diagonal transfer continuity, when U(z;ym¡1) >
U(ym¡1;ym¡1), U(ym¡1;ym¡2) > U(ym¡2;ym¡2), :::, U(y1;y0) > U(y0;y0), we have not
only U(z;Vx) > U(Vx;Vx), but also U(ym¡1;Vx) > U(Vx;Vx), :::, U(y1;Vx) > U(Vx;Vx)
since it is also k-recursively diagonal transfer continuous for k = 1;2:::, m-1. That means all of
the points in Vx are upset by the sequence of securing strategy proﬁles fy1;:::;ym¡1;ymg that
directly or indirectly upset y0.
Recursive diagonal transfer continuity means that whenever x is not an equilibrium, there
is a strategy proﬁle y0 and an open set of candidate strategy proﬁles containing x, all of which
are upset by all securing strategy proﬁles that directly or indirectly upset y0. This implies that,
if equilibrium fails to exist, then there is a nonequilibrium strategy proﬁle x such that for every
y0 2 X and every neighborhood Vx of x, some deviation strategy proﬁles in the neighborhood
cannot be upset by a securing strategy proﬁle z that directly or indirectly upsets y0.
Recursive diagonal transfer continuity refers to the fact that, when U(y;x) > U(x;x), y may
be transferred to a sequence of securing strategy proﬁles fy1;y2;:::;ymg in order for all points in
a neighborhood of x to be upset by these securing strategy proﬁles. The usual notion of continuity
would require that this dominance hold at y for all points in a neighborhood of x.
REMARK 3.2 When m = 0, there is no recursive upsetting. 0-recursive diagonal transfer con-
tinuity becomes the diagonal transfer continuity whenever there is a securing strategy proﬁle y0.
Also, recursive diagonal transfer continuity neither implies nor is implied by continuity for games
9with two or more players.4 This point becomes clear when one sees recursive diagonal transfer
continuity is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium for arbitrary strategy spaces and payoff functions while continuity of the aggregate payoff
function is not a necessary nor sufﬁcient condition for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium.
Before proceeding to our main result, we describe the basic idea why recursive diagonal trans-
fer continuity ensures the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a compact game. When
a compact game fails to have pure strategy Nash equilibrium, every strategy proﬁle x will be upset
by another strategy proﬁle y0. Then, by recursive diagonal transfer continuity, there is some open
set of candidate proﬁles containing x, all of which will be upset by some securing strategy pro-
ﬁle z that directly or indirectly upsets y0. Then there are ﬁnite strategy proﬁles fx1;x2;:::;xng
whose neighborhoods cover X. Thus, all of the points in a neighborhood, say Vx1, will be upset
by a corresponding deviation proﬁle z1, which means z1 cannot be an element in Vx1. If it is in
some other neighborhood, say, Vx2, then it can be shown that z2 will upset all strategy proﬁles in
the union of Vx1 and Vx2 so that z2 is not in the union of Vx1 and Vx2. Suppose z2 2 Vx3. Then
we can similarly show that z3 is not in the union of Vx1, Vx2 and Vx3. Repeating such arguments,
we can show that zk 62 Vx1 [ Vx2 [ :::;[Vxk, i..e, zk is not in the union of Vx1, Vx2;:::;Vxk
for k = 1;2;:::;n. In other words, zk 62 Vxj for all j · k and k = 1;2;:::;n so that the se-
curing strategy proﬁle zn will not be in the strategy space X, which is impossible. Thus recursive
diagonal transfer continuity guarantees the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Now we are ready to state our main result that strictly generalizes all the existing results on
the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium as special cases.
THEOREM 3.1 SupposeG = (Xi;ui)i2I iscompact. Then, thegameGpossessesapurestrategy
Nash equilibrium if and only if it is recursively diagonal transfer continuous on X.
PROOF. Sufﬁciency ((). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. Then, by recursive diagonal transfer continuity, for each x 2 X, there exists y0 and a
neighborhood Vx such that U(z;Vx) > U(Vx;Vx) whenever y0 2 X is recursively upset by z, i.e.,
for any sequence of recursive securing strategy proﬁles fy1;:::;ym¡1;ymg with U(ym;ym¡1) >
U(ym¡1;ym¡1), U(ym¡1;ym¡2) > U(ym¡2;ym¡2), :::, U(y1;y0) > U(y0;y0) for m ¸ 1, we
have U(z;Vx) > U(Vx;Vx). Since there is no equilibrium by the contrapositive hypothesis and
4In one-player games recursive diagonal transfer continuity is equivalent to the player’s utility function possessing
a maximum on a compact set, and consequently it implies transfer weak upper continuity introduced in Tian and Zhou
(1995), which is weaker than continuity.
10the game is recursively diagonal transfer continuous on X, such a sequence of recursive securing
strategy proﬁles fy1;:::;ym¡1;ymg exists for some m ¸ 1.
Since X is compact and X µ
S
x2X Vx, there is a ﬁnite set fx1;:::;xLg such that X µ
SL
i=1 Vxi. For each of such xi, the corresponding initial deviation proﬁle is denoted by y0i so that
U(zi;Vxi) > U(Vxi;Vxi) whenever y0i is recursively upset by zi.
Since there is no equilibrium, for each of such y0i, there exists zi such that U(zi;y0i) >
U(y0i;y0i), and then, by 1-recursive diagonal transfer continuity, we have U(zi;Vxi) >
U(Vxi;Vxi). Now consider the set of securing strategy proﬁles fz1;:::;zng. Then, zi 62 Vxi,
otherwise, by U(zi;Vxi) > U(Vxi;Vxi), we will have U(zi;zi) > U(zi;zi), a contradiction. So
we must have z1 62 V(x1).
Without loss of generality, we suppose z1 2 Vx2. Since U(z2;z1) > U(z1;z1) by noting
that z1 2 Vx2 and U(z1;y01) > U(y01;y01), then, by 2-recursive diagonal transfer continuity, we
have U(z2;Vx1) > U(Vx1;Vx1). Also, U(z2;Vx2) > U(Vx2;Vx2). Thus U(z2;Vx1 [ Vx2) >
U(Vx1 [ Vx2;Vx1 [ Vx2), and consequently z2 62 Vx1 [ Vx2.
Again, without loss of generality, we suppose z2 2 Vx3. Since U(z3;z2) > U(z2;z2) by
noting that z2 2 Vx3, U(z2;z1) > U(z1;z1), and U(z1;y01) > U(y01;y01), by 3-recursive diag-
onal transfer continuity, we have U(z3;Vx1) > U(Vx1;Vx1). Also, since U(z3;z2) > U(z2;z2)
and U(z2;y02) > U(y02;y02), by 2-recursive diagonal transfer continuity, we have U(z3;Vx2) >
U(Vx2;Vx2). Thus, we have U(z3;Vx1 [Vx2 [Vx3) > U(Vx1 [Vx2 [Vx3;Vx1 [Vx2 [Vx3), and
consequently z3 62 Vx1 [ Vx2 [ Vx3.
Applying repeatedly the above arguments, we can show that zk 62 Vx1 [Vx2 [:::;[Vxk, i.e.,
zk is not in the union of Vx1;Vx2;:::;Vxk for k = 1;2;:::;L. In particular, for k = L, we have
zL 62 Vx1 [ Vx2 ::: [ VxL and so zL 62 X, a contradiction.
Necessity ()). Suppose x¤ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and U(y;x) > U(x;x) for
x;y 2 X. Let y0 = x¤ and Vx be a neighborhood of x. Since U(y;x¤) · U(x¤;x¤) for
all y 2 Y , it is impossible to ﬁnd any sequence of strategy proﬁles fy1;y2;:::;ymg such that
U(y1;y0) > U(y0;y0), U(y2;y1) > U(y1;y1);:::;U(ym;ym¡1) > U(ym¡1;ym¡1). Hence,
the recursive diagonal transfer continuity holds trivially.
Theorem 3.1 provides a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a game to have a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium, which can be used to show the existence/non-existence of pure strategy Nash
equilibrium for these games. Five examples that illustrate the usefulness of the above result will
be given in Subsection 3.3 below.
In general, the weaker the conditions in an existence theorem are, the harder it is to verify
whether the conditions are satisﬁed in a particular game. Although these examples show the use-
11fulness of Theorem 3.1, especially in proving the nonexistence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
given the generality of the condition, it is not surprising that the condition is, in general, not easy
to check from a practical point of view. Since the main purpose of the paper is to characterize
the existence of equilibria in games with general strategy spaces and payoffs, the condition does
suggest a way to interpret equilibrium existence. It mainly shows what is possible for a game
to have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, adding speciﬁcity to the model, we may
get sufﬁcient conditions for recursive diagonal transfer continuity, and consequently provide new
sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
DEFINITION 3.4 (Deviation Transitivity) G = (Xi;ui)i2I is said to be deviational transitive if
U(y2;y1) > U(y1;y1) and U(y1;y0) > U(y0;y0) imply that U(y2;y0) > U(y0;y0). That is, the
upsetting dominance relation is transitive.
COROLLARY 3.1 Suppose G = (Xi;ui)i2I is compact and deviational transitive. Then, there
exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium point if and only if G is 1-recursively diagonal transfer
continuous.
PROOF. We only need to show that, when G is deviational transitive, 1-recursive diagonal transfer
continuity implies m-recursive diagonal transfer continuity for m ¸ 1. Suppose x is not an
equilibrium. Then, by 1-recursive diagonal transfer continuity, there exists a strategy proﬁle y0 2
X and a neighborhood Vx of x such that U(z;Vx) > U(Vx;Vx) whenever U(z;y0) > U(y0;y0)
for any z 2 X.
Now, for any sequence of deviation proﬁles fy1;:::;ym¡1;ymg, if U(ym;ym¡1) >
U(ym¡1;ym¡1), U(ym¡1;ym¡2) > U(ym¡2;ym¡2), :::, U(y1;y0) > U(y0;y0), we then have
U(ym;y0) > U(y0;y0) by deviation transitivity of U, and thus by 1-recursive diagonal trans-
fer continuity, U(ym;Vx) > U(Vx;Vx). Since m is arbitrary, G is recursively diagonal transfer
continuous.
3.2 Discussion and Related Work
The recursive diagonal transfer continuity we propose is of transfer type. The basic transfer
method is developed in Tian (1992, 1993), Tian and Zhou (1992, 1995), Zhou (1992), and Baye,
Tian, and Zhou (1993) for studying the maximization of binary relations that may be nontotal or
nontransitive and the existence of equilibrium in games that may have discontinuous or nonquasi-
concave payoffs. They develop three types of transfers: transfer continuities, transfer convexities,
and transfer transitivities. This kind of properties have provided milestones in the literature on
12the maximization of binary relations and the existence of equilibrium in games with discontinu-
ous and/or nonquasiconcave payoffs. Various notions of transfer continuities, transfer convexities
and transfer transitivities provide complete solutions to the question of the existence of maxi-
mal elements for complete preorders and interval orders — cf. Tian (1993) and Tian and Zhou
(1995). The recursive diagonal transfer continuity proposed in this paper extends the static trans-
fer approach to a dynamic (sequential) one so that it enables us to provide a complete solution to
the question of the existence of equilibrium in games with arbitrary compact strategy spaces and
payoffs.
We now discuss how Theorem 3.1 yields the results of Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993), Reny
(1999), Nessah and Tian (2008), and Barelli and Soza (2009).
Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in games
with discontinuous and nonquasiconcave payoffs by introducing the concepts of diagonal transfer
continuity and diagonal transfer qausiconcavity.
DEFINITION 3.5 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is diagonally transfer quasiconcave in y if, for
any ﬁnite subset Y m = fy1;:::;ymg ½ X, there exists a corresponding ﬁnite subset Xm =
fx1;:::;xmg ½ X such that for any subset fxk1
;xk2
;:::;xks








Theorem 1 in Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) shows that diagonal transfer quasi-concavity is
necessary, and further, under diagonal transfer continuity and compactness, sufﬁcient for the exis-
tence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Reny (1999) studies the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous games by
introducing the concepts of payoff security and better-reply security.
Let ¡ = f(x;u) 2 X £ Rn : ui(x) = ui; 8i 2 Ig be the graph of the game. The closure of
¡ in X £ Rn is denoted by ¹ ¡. The frontier of ¡, which is the set of points in ¹ ¡ but not in ¡, is
denoted by Fr ¡.
DEFINITION 3.6 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is better-reply secure if, whenever (x¤;u¤) 2 ¹ ¡, x¤
is not an equilibrium implies that there is some player i, xi 2 Xi, and an open neighborhood Vx¡i
of x¡i such that ui(xi;y¡i) > ui(x¤) for all y¡i 2 Vx¡i.
The notion of better-reply security also uses the same idea of transferring a non-equilibrium
strategy to a securing strategy, and thus it actually falls in the form of transfer continuity.
Theorem 3.1 in Reny (1999) shows that a gameG = (Xi; ui)i2I possesses a Nash equilibrium
if it is compact, bounded, quasiconcave and better-reply secure. Reny (1999) and Bagh and Jofre
(2006) provide sufﬁcient conditions for a game to be better-reply secure.
13DEFINITION 3.7 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is payoff secure if for every player i, x 2 X, and ² >
0, there exists xi 2 Xi and an open neighborhood Vx¡i of x¡i such that ui(xi;y¡i) ¸ ui(x) ¡ ²
for all y¡i 2 Vx¡i.
DEFINITION 3.8 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is reciprocally upper semicontinuous if, whenever
(x;u) 2 ¹ ¡ and ui(x) · ui for every player i, ui(x) = ui for every player i.
DEFINITION 3.9 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is weakly reciprocal upper semi-continuous if, for
any (x;u) 2 Fr ¡, there is a player i and ^ xi 2 Xi such that ui(^ xi;x¡i) > ui.
Reny (1999) shows that a game G = (Xi;ui)i2I is better-reply secure if it is payoff secure
and reciprocally upper semi-continuous. Bagh and Jofre (2006) further show that G = (Xi;ui)i2I
is better-reply secure if it is payoff secure and weakly reciprocal upper semi-continuous.
To provide more sufﬁcient conditions for recursive diagonal transfer continuity, as a comple-
ment of this paper, Nessah and Tian (2008) recently introduce a new notion of weak continuity,
called weak transfer quasi-continuity, which is weaker than the most known weak notions of con-
tinuity, including diagonal transfer continuity in Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) and better-reply
security in Reny (1999), and holds in a large class of discontinuous games.
DEFINITION 3.10 A game G = (Xi;ui)i2I is said to be weakly transfer quasi-continuous if,
whenever x 2 X is not an equilibrium, there exists a strategy proﬁle y 2 X and a neighborhood
V(x) of x so that for every x0 2 V(x), there exists a player i such that ui(yi;x0
¡i) > ui(x0).
They also provide some sufﬁcient conditions, each of which implies weak transfer quasi-
continuity: (1) transfer continuity, (2) weak transfer continuity, (3) weak transfer upper continuity
and payoff security, and (4) upper semicontinuity and weak transfer lower continuity.
DEFINITION 3.11 A game G = (Xi;ui)i2I is said to be transfer continuous if for all player i,
whenever ui(zi;x¡i) > ui(x) for zi 2 Xi and x 2 X, there is some neighborhood V(x) of x and
yi 2 Xi such that ui(yi;x0
¡i) > ui(x0) for all x0 2 V(x).
DEFINITION 3.12 A game G = (Xi;ui)i2I is said to be weakly transfer continuous if, whenever
x 2 X is not an equilibrium, there exists a player i, yi 2 Xi and a neighborhood Vx of x such that
ui(yi;x0
¡i) > ui(x0) for all x0 2 Vx.
DEFINITION 3.13 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be weakly transfer upper continuous if,
whenever x 2 X is not an equilibrium, there exists a player i, ^ xi 2 Xi and a neighborhood Vx of
x such that ui(^ xi;x¡i) > ui(x0) for all x0 2 Vx.
14DEFINITION 3.14 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is said to be weakly transfer lower continuous if,
whenever x is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a player i, yi 2 Xi, and a neighborhood Vx¡i
of x¡i such that ui(yi;x0
¡i) > ui(x) for all x0
¡i 2 Vx¡i.
They also introduce some new notions of transfer type of quasiconcavity, called strong di-
agonal transfer quasiconcavity and weak diagonal transfer quasiconcavity, each of which is a
necessary condition for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and consequently a nec-
essary condition for recursive diagonal transfer continuity.
DEFINITION 3.15 A game G = (Xi;ui)i2I is said to be strongly diagonal transfer quasi-
concave if for any ﬁnite subset fy1;:::;ymg ½ X, there exists a corresponding ﬁnite subset
fx1;:::;xmg ½ X such that for any subset fxk1
;xk2
;:::;xks




g, there exists yh 2 fyk1
;:::;yks
g satisfying ui(ykh
i ;x¡i) · ui(x) for all
i 2 I.
DEFINITION 3.16 A game G = (Xi;ui)i2I is said to be weakly diagonal transfer quasiconcave
if for any ﬁnite subset fy1;:::;ymg ½ X, there exists a corresponding ﬁnite subset fx1;:::;xmg ½
X such that for each ~ x =
P
i;j





i; ~ x¡i) ¡ ui(~ x)] · 0;
where ¸i;j ¸ 0 with
P
i;j
¸i;j = 1 and J = f(i;j : ¸i;j > 0g.
It may be remarked that a game G is: (1) weakly transfer quasi-continuous if it is weakly
transfer continuous, diagonally transfer continuous or better reply secure; (2) weakly transfer
upper continuous if it is upper semicontinuous; and (3) weakly diagonal transfer quasiconcave
and diagonally transfer quasiconcave if it is strongly diagonal transfer quasiconcave.
Nessah and Tian (2008) show that a game G = (Xi; ui)i2I possesses a Nash equilibrium
if it is convex, compact, weakly transfer quasi-continuous, and quasiconcave or strongly/weakly
diagonal transfer quasiconcave.
Asasourceofreference, wesummarizetheseresultsascorollariesofTheorem3.1thatprovide
sufﬁcient conditions for recursive diagonal transfer continuity.
COROLLARY 3.2 Suppose G = (Xi;ui)i2I is compact and convex. Then any one of the fol-
lowing conditions is sufﬁcient for a game to be recursively diagonal transfer continuous, and
consequently it possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium:
151. the game is quasiconcave, upper semicontinuous in xi, and group continuous in x5 [Das-
gupta and Maskin (1986)] ;
2. the game is diagonally transfer quasiconcave and diagonally transfer continuous [Baye,
Tian and Zhou (1993)];
3. the game is bounded, quasiconcave, and better-reply secure [Reny (1999)];
4. the game is bounded, quasiconcave, payoff secure, and reciprocally upper semicontinuous
[Reny (1999)];
5. the game is bounded, quasiconcave, payoff secure, and weakly reciprocal upper semicon-
tinuous [Bagh (2006)];
6. thegameisbounded, quasiconcave, andweaklytransferquasi-continuous[NessahandTian
(2008)];
7. the game is strongly diagonal transfer quasiconcave and weakly transfer quasi-continuous
[Nessah and Tian (2008)];
8. the game is bounded, weakly diagonal transfer quasiconcave, and weakly transfer quasi-
continuous [Nessah and Tian (2008)];
9. the game is bounded, weakly diagonal transfer quasiconcave, and diagonally transfer con-
tinuous [Nessah and Tian (2008)];
10. the game is bounded, weakly diagonal transfer quasiconcave, and better-reply secure [Nes-
sah and Tian (2008)];
11. the game is bounded, weakly diagonal transfer quasiconcave, weakly transfer upper contin-
uous, and payoff secure [Nessah and Tian (2008)];
12. the game is bounded, weakly diagonal transfer quasiconcave, weakly transfer lower contin-
uous, and upper semicontinuous [Nessah and Tian (2008)].
In addition, the conditions imposed in Nash (1951), Debreu (1952), Nikaido and Isoda (1955),
Nishimura and Friedman (1981), Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Vives (1990), Carmona (2005),
Morgan and Scalzo (2007), etc., which guarantee the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria,
can be regarded as sufﬁcient conditions of recursive diagonal transfer continuity.
5A payoff function ui : X ! R is graph-continuous if for all x 2 X, there exists a function Fi : A¡i ! Ai with
Fi(¹ x¡i) = ¹ xi such that ui(Fi(x¡i);x¡i) is continuous at x¡i = ¹ x¡i.
16REMARK 3.3 From Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993), one knows that a game is diagonally transfer
quasiconcave if any one of the following conditions is satisﬁed: (1) each ui(xi;x¡i) is concave
in xi; (2) U(x;y) is concave in x; (3) U(x;y) is quasiconcave in x; and (4) U(x;y) is diagonally
quasiconcave in x. A game is diagonally transfer continuous if any one of the following conditions
is satisﬁed: (1) each ui(xi;x¡i) is continuous; (2) each ui(xi;x¡i) is upper semicontinuous in xi
and continuous in x¡i; (3) U(x;y) is continuous; and (4) Á(x;y) ´ U(x;y) ¡ U(y;y) is lower
semicontinuous in y. As a result, any pair of conditions, one each from the sufﬁcient conditions for
diagonal transfer quasi-concavity and diagonal transfer continuity, are sufﬁcient for the existence
of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for games with compact strategy spaces.
3.3 Examples
In this subsection we provide ﬁve examples to illustrate how our main theorem fully characterizes
the existence or nonexistence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games that do not satisfy the
conditions of existing theorems. Examples 1 and 2 are games with pure strategy equilibria that
are accounted for by our Theorem 3.1, but which violate the conditions of existing theorems.
Examples 3-5 are games that do not have an equilibrium because they fail to satisfy our recursive
diagonal transfer continuity condition.






1 if (x1;x2) 2 Q £ Q
0 otherwise
i = 1;2;
where Q = fx 2 [0;1] : x is a rational numberg.
Then the game is compact and convex, but not quasiconcave. It is not weakly transfer quasi-
continuous either (so it is not diagonally transfer continuous, better-reply secure, or weakly trans-
fer continuous either). To see this, consider any nonequilibrium x that consists of irrational num-
bers. Then, for any neighborhood Vx of x, choosing x0 2 Vx with x0
1 2 Q and x0




2) = 1 and u2(x0
1;y2) · u2(x0
1;x0
2) = 1 for any y 2 X. So the game is not
weakly transfer quasi-continuous. Thus, there is no existing theorem that can be applied.
However, it is recursively diagonal transfer continuous on X. Indeed, suppose U(y;x) >
U(x;x) for x = (x1;x2) 2 X and y = (y1;y2) 2 X. Let y0 be any vector with rational
numbers and Vx be a neighborhood of x. Since U(y;y0) · U(y0;y0) for all y 2 Y , it is im-
possible to have fy1;y2;:::;ymg such that U(ym;ym¡1) > U(ym¡1;ym¡1), U(ym¡1;ym¡2) >
17U(ym¡2;ym¡2), :::, U(y1;y0) > U(y0;y0) for any of such strategy proﬁles. Hence, the recur-
sive diagonal transfer continuity holds. Therefore, by Theorem 3.1, this game has a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. In fact, the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria consists of all rational numbers
on [0;1].
EXAMPLE 3.2 Consider the two-player game with the following payoff functions deﬁned on
[0;1] £ [0;1] studied by Barelli and Soza (2009).
ui(xi;x¡i) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
0 if xi 2 (0;1)
1 if xi = 0 and x¡i 2 Q
1 if xi = 1 and x¡i = 2 Q
0 otherwise
;
where Q = fx 2 [0;1] : x is a rational numberg.
This game is convex, compact, bounded and quasiconcave, but it is not weakly transfer quasi-
continuous, and consequently, it is not diagonally transfer continuous, better-reply secure, or
weakly transfer continuous, either. Thus, there is no existing theorem that can be applied.
To see the game is not weakly transfer quasi-continuous, consider the nonequilibrium x =
(1;1). We then cannot ﬁnd any y 2 X and any neighborhood V(1;1) of (1;1) such that for every
x0 2 Vx, there is a player i with ui(yi;x0
¡i) > ui(x0). We show this by considering two cases.
Case 1. y2 6= 0. Then, for any neighborhood V(1;1) of (1;1), choosing x0 2 Vx with x0
1 = 1
and x0
2 62 Q, we have u1(y1;x0
2) · u1(x0
1;x0




Case 2. y2 = 0. When y1 6= 0, choosing x0 2 Vx with x0
2 = 1 and x0




2) = 0 and u2(x0
1;y2) · u2(x0
1;x0
2) = 1. When y1 = 0, choosing x0 2 Vx
with x0
1 62 Q and x0
2 62 Q, we have u1(y1;x0
2) = u1(x0
1;x0




Thus, the game is not weakly transfer quasi-continuous, and Theorems 3.1-3.3 of Nessah and
Tian (2008) can not be applied.
However, it is recursively diagonal transfer quasi-continuous. Indeed, suppose U(y;x) >
U(x;x) for x = (x1;x2) 2 X and y = (y1;y2) 2 X. Let y0 = (0;0) and Vx be a neighborhood
of x. Since U(y;y0) · U(y0;y0) for all y 2 Y , it is impossible to have fy1;y2;:::;ymg such
that U(ym;ym¡1) > U(ym¡1;ym¡1), U(ym¡1;ym¡2) > U(ym¡2;ym¡2), :::, U(y1;y0) >
U(y0;y0) for any of such strategy proﬁles. Hence, the recursive diagonal transfer continuity
holds. Therefore, by Theorem 3.1, this game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Our full characterization result is especially useful to check the nonexistence of equilibrium
of economic games. No such result is available in the literature.
18EXAMPLE 3.3 (DASGUPTA AND MASKIN) Consider the following game studied by Dasgupta





0 if x1 = x2 = 1
xi otherwise
i = 1;2:
The game is not recursively diagonal transfer continuous on X. To see this, for x = (1;1)
and y 2 (0;1) £ (0;1), we have U(y;x) > U(x;x). We then cannot ﬁnd any y0 2 X and
neighborhood Vx of x such that U(z;x0) > U(x0;x0) for every deviation proﬁle z that is upset
directly or indirectly by y0 for all x0 2 Vx. We show this by considering two cases.
Case 1. y0 6= (1;1). Then, for any neighborhood V(1;1) of (1;1), choosing strategy proﬁles
z 2 X and x0 2 V(1;1) such that y0
1 +y0
2 < z1+z2 < x0
1+x0
2, we then have U(z;y0) > U(y0;y0)
but U(z;x0) < U(x0;x0).
Case 2. y0 = (1;1). Then, for any neighborhood V(1;1) of (1;1), choosing strategy proﬁles




2, we then have U(z;y0) >
U(y0;y0) but U(z;x0) < U(x0;x0).
Thus, we cannot ﬁnd any y0 2 X and any neighborhood V0 of (1;1) such that U(z;x0) >
U(x0;x0) for every deviation proﬁle z that is upset by y0 for all x0 2 Vx. Hence, the game is not
recursively diagonal transfer continuous on X, and therefore, by Theorem 3.1, there is no pure
strategy Nash equilibrium on X.
EXAMPLE 3.4 (KARLIN) Consider games of “timing” or “silent duel”, which have been stud-
ied by Karlin (1959), Owen (1968), Jones (1980), and Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). These are
symmetric two-person zero-sum games on the unit square so that n = 2, X1 = X2 = [0;1], and






x1 ¡ x2 + x1x2; if x1 < x2
0; if x1 = x2
x1 ¡ x2 ¡ x1x2; if x1 > x2
:
Consider x = (x1;x2) = (1;1). It can be veriﬁed that U(y;x) > U(x;x) implies that y must
satisfy one of the following three sets of conditions: (1) y1 + y2 > 1, y1 < 1, and y2 < 1; (2)
y1 = 1 and y2 > 1=2, and (3) y2 = 1 and y1 > 1=2. We then cannot ﬁnd any y0 2 X and
neighborhood Vx of x such that U(z;x0) > U(x0;x0) for every deviation proﬁle z that is upset
directly or indirectly by y0 for all x0 2 Vx. To show this, four cases need to be considered.
Case 1. y0
1 < 1 and y0
2 < 1. Then, for any neighborhood V(1;1) of (1;1), choose strat-
egy proﬁles z 2 X and x0 2 V(1;1) such that y0
1 < z1 < x0
1 and y0
2 < z2 < x0
2. Since




















1;z2) < 0. Thus,
we have U(z;y0) > U(y0;y0) but U(z;x0) < U(x0;x0).
Case 2. y0
1 = 1 and y0
2 < 1. Then, for any neighborhood V(1;1) of (1;1), choose strategy
proﬁles z 2 X and x0 2 V(1;1) such that y0
1 = z1 = x0
1 and y0
2 < z2 < x0
2. Then, by the
monotonicity of u1(y1;y2) and u2(y1;y2) = ¡u1(y1;y2), we have U(z;y0) > U(y0;y0) but
U(z;x0) < U(x0;x0).
Case 3. y0
1 < 1 and y0
2 = 1. Then, for any neighborhood V(1;1) of (1;1), choose strategy
proﬁles z 2 X and x0 2 V(1;1) such that y0
1 < z1 < x0
1 and y0
2 = z2 = x0
2. Then, by similar
reasoning, we have U(z;y0) > U(y0;y0) but U(z;x0) < U(x0;x0).
Case 4. y0
1 = 1 and y0
2 = 1. Then, for any neighborhood V(1;1) of (1;1), choose strategy
proﬁles z 2 X and x0 2 V(1;1) such that 1=2 < z1 < x0
1 and 1=2 = z2 = x0











2z2¡1 > 0, u1(z1;x0
2)¡u1(x0
1;x0







0, and consequently, U(z;y0) > U(y0;y0) but U(z;x0) < U(x0;x0).
Thus, we cannot ﬁnd any y0 2 X and any neighborhood V0 of (1;1) such that U(z;x0) >
U(x0;x0) for every deviation proﬁle z that is upset by y0 for all x0 2 Vx. Hence, the game is not
recursively diagonal transfer continuous on X, and therefore, by Theorem 3.1, there is no pure
strategy Nash equilibrium on X.





2x1 ¡ 1; if x1 < x2
0; if x1 = x2
1 ¡ 2x2; if x1 > x2
:
In this game, the payoff function ui(x1;x2) is neither diagonally transfer continuous nor quasi-
concave in yi for i = 1. Therefore, theorems in Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) and Reny (1999) are
not applicable.
Suppose U(y;x) > U(x;x) for x = (x1;x2) 2 X and y = (y1;y2) 2 X. Let
y0 = (1=2;1=2) and Vx be a neighborhood of x. Since U(y;y0) · U(y0;y0) for all
y 2 Y , it is impossible to have fy1;y2;:::;ymg such that U(ym;ym¡1) > U(ym¡1;ym¡1),
U(ym¡1;ym¡2) > U(ym¡2;ym¡2), :::, U(y1;y0) > U(y0;y0) for any of such strategy proﬁles.
Hence, the recursive diagonal transfer continuity holds. Therefore, by Theorem 3.1, this game has
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
20EXAMPLE 3.5 (VARIAN) Consider a two-person game with nonnegative price strategies p1 and





pi(I + ¹)k if pi < pi
pi(I
2 + ¹)k if p1 = p2
pi¹k if pi > pi
i = 1;2:
This game has a number of interpretations. Varian (1980) interprets I to be the number of in-
formed consumers, who will shop at the ﬁrm charging the lowest price, while 2¹ is the number of
uninformed consumers, who allocate themselves equally across the two ﬁrms. Thus each ﬁrm sells
to ¹ uninformed consumers automatically, but gets the I informed consumers only if it succeeds
in setting the lowest price.
It is well known that this game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium (cf. Varian (1980);
Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1992)), and in fact we can similarly verify that U is not recursively
diagonal transfer continuous. Thus, by Theorem 3.1, the blame unambiguously lies squarely on
the fact that the game is not recursively diagonal transfer continuous.
4 Full Characterization of Symmetric Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
The techniques developed in the previous section can be used to fully characterize the existence of
symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Throughout this section, we assume that the strat-
egy spaces for all players are the same. As such, let X0 = X1 = ::: = Xn. If in addi-
tion, u1(y;x;:::;x) = u2(x;y;x;:::;x) = :::;un(x;:::;x;y) for all x;y 2 X, we say that
G = (Xi;ui)i2I is a quasi-symmetric game.
DEFINITION 4.1 A Nash equilibrium (x¤
1;:::;x¤




For convenience, we denote, for each player i, and for all x;y 2 X0, ui(x;:::;y;:::;x) the
function ui evaluated at the strategy in which player i chooses y and all others choose x.
Deﬁne a quasi-symmetric function Ã : X0 £ X0 ! R by
Ã(y;x) = ui(x;:::;y;:::;x): (4)
Since G is quasi-symmetric, x¤ is a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if
Ã(y;x¤) · Ã(x¤;x¤) for all y 2 Xi.
We then have the following theorem.
21THEOREM 4.1 Suppose a game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is quasi-symmetric and compact. Then it
possesses a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if Ã(y;x) deﬁned by (4) is
recursively diagonal transfer continuous on X.
PROOF. The proof is the same as that of Theorem 3.1 provided U is replaced by Ã, thus it is
omitted here.
Theorem 4.1 strictly generalizes all the existing results on the existence of symmetric pure
strategy Nash equilibrium such as those in Reny (1999).
EXAMPLE 4.1 (BAGH AND JOFRE) The following two-person concession quasi-symmetric
game on the unit square considered by Bagh and Jofre (2006) is a special case of a class of timing
games on the unit square considered by Reny (1999). The payoffs are:
ui(x1;x2) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
10; if xi < x¡i
1; if xi = x¡i < 0:5
0; if xi = x¡i ¸ 0:5
¡10; if xi > x¡i
:
Note that the payoffs are not quasiconcave (nor are they quasiconcave along the diagonal of
the unit square). We now show that Ã is recursively diagonal transfer continuous, and thus the
game possesses a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. Indeed, let Ã(y;x) = ui(y;x). Suppose
Ã(y;x) > Ã(x;x) for x = (x1;x2) 2 X and y = (y1;y2) 2 X. Let y0 = (0;0) and Vx
be a neighborhood of x. It is clear that Ã(y;y0) · Ã(y0;y0) for all y 2 Y , and thus it is im-
possible to have fy1;y2;:::;ymg such that Ã(ym;ym¡1) > Ã(ym¡1;ym¡1), Ã(ym¡1;ym¡2) >
Ã(ym¡2;ym¡2), :::, Ã(y1;y0) > Ã(y0;y0) for any of such strategy proﬁles. Hence, the recursive
diagonal transfer continuity holds, and thus by Theorem 4.1, this game has a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
EXAMPLE 4.2 (HENDRICKS AND WILSON) Consider the concession quasi-symmetric game
between two players studied by Hendricks and Wilson (1983), Simon (1987), and Reny (1999).
The players must choose a time x1;x2 2 [0;1] to quit the game. The player who quits last wins,
although conditional on winning, quitting earlier is preferred. If both players quit at the same time,





¡xi; if xi < x¡i
1=2 ¡ xi; if xi = x¡i
1 ¡ xi; if xi > x¡i
:
22Note that the payoffs are not quasiconcave (nor are they quasiconcave along the diagonal of
the unit square) although U is diagonally transfer continuous by Proposition 2.(e) in Baye, Tian,
and Zhou (1993). We now show that Ã is not recursively diagonal transfer continuous, and thus
the game does not possess a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. To see this, consider x = 0. It
is clear that Ã(y;x) = ui(y;0) > ui(0;0) implies that 0 < y < 1=2. We then cannot ﬁnd any
y0 2 X0 and neighborhood Vx of x such that Ã(z;x0) > Ã(x0;x0) for every deviation proﬁle z
that is upset by y0 for all x0 2 Vx. We show this by considering two cases.
Case 1. y0 6= 0. Then, for any neighborhood V0 of 0, choose a strategy proﬁle z 2 [0;1]
and a strategy proﬁle x0 2 V0 such that maxf1=2 + ²;y0g < z < 1=2 + y0 and x0 < ², where
0 < ² < minf1=2;y0g. Then, by z > y0 and 1 ¡ z > 1=2 ¡ y0, we have Ã(z;y0) > Ã(y0;y0).
However, since z > x0 and 1=2+x0 < 1=2+² < z, we have 1¡z < 1=2¡x0, and consequently
Ã(z;x0) < Ã(x0;x0).
Case 2. y0 = 0. Note that Ã(z;y0) > Ã(y0;y0) if and only if 0 < z < 1=2. Then, for
any neighborhood V0 of 0, choosing a positive number ² such that (²=2;²) ½ V0, z = ²=2 and
a strategy proﬁle x0 2 V0 such that x0 2 (²=2;²), we have Ã(z;y0) > Ã(y0;y0) but Ã(z;x0) =
¡z < 1=2 ¡ x0 = Ã(x0;x0).
Thus, we cannot ﬁnd any y0 2 [0;1] and any neighborhood V0 of 0 such that Ã(z;x0) >
Ã(x0;x0) for every deviation proﬁle z that is upset by y0 for all x0 2 Vx. Therefore, Ã is not
recursively diagonal transfer continuous on X0, and thus, by Theorem 4.1, there is no symmetric
pure strategy Nash equilibrium on X.
Besides, since all the games in Examples 3.1-3.5 are quasisymmetric, it is even easier to show
the existence/nonexistence of pure strategy (symmetric) Nash equilibrium by working on a single
payoff function Ã, instead of the aggregate payoff function U that is the sum of individual payoff
functions.
Similar to Corollary 3.1, the following corollary is reached.
COROLLARY 4.1 Suppose a game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is quasi-symmetric, compact, and devia-
tional transitive. Then it possesses a pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium if and only if
Ã(x;y) deﬁned by (4) is 1-recursively diagonal transfer continuous on X.
We now provide some sufﬁcient conditions for a game to be deviational transitive and 1-
recursively diagonal transfer continuous.
DEFINITION 4.2 A game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is diagonally monotonic if for each ¹ x 2 X0,
ui(¹ x;:::;x;:::; ¹ x) is either: (i) decreasing in x on X0 n ¹ x or (ii) increasing in x on X0 n ¹ x.
23The following propositions provide sufﬁcient conditions for a game G = (Xi;ui)i2I to be
deviational transitive and 1-recursively diagonal transfer continuous.
PROPOSITION 4.1 Suppose Xi is a subset of R. If a game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is diagonally
monotonic, Ã is deviational transitive.
PROOF. We only need to show the case where Ã is nondecreasing in x. The proof of the case
where Ã is non-increasing in x is similar.
We need to show that Ã(z;y) > Ã(y;y) and Ã(y;x) > Ã(x;x) imply that Ã(z;x) > Ã(x;x).
Indeed, when Ã(y;x) > Ã(x;x), i.e., ui(x;:::;y;:::;x) > ui(x;:::;x), we have y > x by
monotonicity of ui(x;:::;y;:::;x). When Ã(z;y) > Ã(y;y), we have z > y by monotonicity
of ui(x;:::;y;:::;x). Thus we have z > y > x. Then, by monotonicity of ui(x;:::;y;:::;x),
we have
ui(x;:::;z;:::;x) > ui(x;:::;y;:::;x) > ui(x;:::;x)
and therefore Ã(y;x) = ui(x;:::;z;:::;x) > Ã(x;x), which means Ã is deviational transitive.
PROPOSITION 4.2 Suppose Xi is a subset of R and a game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is diagonally
monotonic. Any of the following conditions implies it is 1-recursively diagonal transfer continuous
in x.
(i) ui(¹ x;:::;x;:::; ¹ x) is continuous in x;
(ii) ui(¹ x;:::;x;:::; ¹ x) is upper semi-continuous in x;
PROOF. We only need to prove the case of upper semi-continuity and the case where Ã is increas-
ing in x. The proof of the case where Ã is decreasing in x is similar.
Suppose Ã(y;x) > Ã(x;x) for x;y 2 X0. We need to show that there exists a point y0 2 X0
and a neighborhood Vx of x such that Ã(z;Vx) > Ã(Vx;Vx) whenever Ã(z;y0) > Ã(y0;y0).
Indeed, since Ã(y;x) > Ã(x;x), we have y > x by diagonal monotonicity of Ã. Let y0 =
x + ± < y for some positive ± > 0. We have Ã(y0;x) > Ã(x;x) by diagonal monotonicity of Ã.
Then, by upper semi-continuity, there is a neighborhood Vx = fx0 2 X0 : jx0 ¡ xj < ²g such that
Ã(y0;x) > Ã(x0;x) for all x0 2 Vx. Since ui(¹ x;:::;x;:::; ¹ x) is nondecreasing in x on X0 n ¹ x
for all ¹ x 2 X0, we particularly have Ã(y0;x0) > Ã(x0;x0) for all ¹ x = x0 2 Vx. Thus, whenever
Ã(z;y0) > Ã(y0;y0), we have z > y0 by diagonal monotonicity of Ã, and therefore, we have
Ã(z;x0) > Ã(y0;x0) > Ã(x0;x0) for all x0 2 Vx, which means Ã is 1-recursively diagonal transfer
continuous in x.
24EXAMPLE 4.3 (BAYE AND KOVENOCK; BAYE, TIAN, AND ZHOU) Consider the two-player
quasi-symmetric game studied by Baye and Kovenock (1993), and Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993).
Two duopolists have zero costs and set prices (p1;p2) on Z = [0;T]£[0;T]. The payoff functions





pi if pi · p¡i
pi ¡ c otherwise
:
One can interpret the game as a duopoly in which each ﬁrm has committed to pay brand loyal
consumers a penalty of c if the other ﬁrm beats its price.6 These payoffs are neither quasiconcave
nor continuous. However, the game is diagonally monotonic and upper semicontinuous, and thus
it is 1-recursively diagonal transfer continuous. Thus, by Corollary 4.1, this game possesses a
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
We end this section by discussing how Theorem 4.1 covers Reny’s result as a corollary.
The game G = (Xi;ui)i2I is diagonally quasiconcave if Xi is convex, and for
every player i, all x1;:::;xm 2 X and all x 2 cofx1;:::;xmg, ui(x;:::;x) ¸
min1·k·m ui(x;:::;xk;:::;x).
DEFINITION 4.3 A game G = (Xi;ui)i2I is diagonally better-reply secure if, whenever
(x¤;u¤) 2 X £ R is in the closure of the graph of its payoff function and (x¤;:::;x¤) is not
an equilibrium, there is some player i, y 2 X0, and an open neighborhood Vx¤ of x¤ such that
Ã(y;x0) > Ã(x¤) for all x0 2 Vx¤.
COROLLARY 4.2 (RENY (1999)) If G = (Xi;ui)i2I is quasi-symmetric, compact, diangonally
quasiconcave, and better-reply secure, then it possesses a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium.
5 Full Characterization of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria
In this section, we fully characterize the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium as corollar-
ies to the pure strategy existence results derived in the previous sections. We assume throughout
this section that each ui is both bounded and measurable, and Xi is a compact Hausdorff space
so we call G = (Xi;ui)i2I a compact, Hausdorff game. Consequently, if Mi denotes the set of
(regular, countably additive) probability measures on the Borel subsets of Xi , Mi is compact in
6See Baye and Kovenock (1993) for an alternative formulation with both brand loyal and price conscious consumers,
whereby a ﬁrm commits to pay a penalty if it does not provide the best price in the market.
25the weak¤ topology. Extend each ui to
Q
i2I Mi by deﬁning ui(¹) =
R
X ui(x)d¹ for all ¹ 2 M,
and let ¹ G = (Mi;ui)i2I denote the mixed extension of G, where M =
Q
i2I Mi.
The deﬁnitions of recursive diagonal transfer continuity, etc. given in the previous sections,
apply in the obvious ways to the mixed extension ¹ G.
We now present the mixed strategy implications of Theorem 3.1.
THEOREM 5.1 Suppose that G = (Mi;ui)i2I is a compact, Hausdorff game. Then G possesses
a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if its mixed extension, ¹ G, is recursively diagonal
transfer continuous.
This theorem strictly generalizes all the existence results on the mixed strategy equilibrium
in the literature such as those in Nash (1950), Glicksberg (1952), Mas-Colell (1984), Dasgupta
and Maskin (1986), Robson (1994), Simon (1987), Reny (1999), Monteiro and Page (2007), and
Nessah and Tian (2008). Any sufﬁcient conditions imposed in the existing theorems on the exis-
tence of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium imply the recursive diagonal transfer continuity of ¹ U(¢).
To illustrate this, we present here the results of Monteiro and Page (2007), and Nessah and Tian
(2008) as corollaries of Theorem 5.1. We ﬁrst state some deﬁnitions introduced by them.
Monteiro and Page (2007) introduce the concept of uniform payoff security for games with
compact separable metric strategy spaces and payoffs bounded and measurable in players’ strate-
gies. They show that if a game is compact and uniformly payoff secure, then its mixed extension
¹ G is payoff secure.
DEFINITION 5.1 The game G is uniformly payoffsecure if for every player i 2 I, every xi 2 Xi,
and every ² > 0, there is a strategy xi 2 Xi such that for every y¡i 2 X¡i, there exists a
neighborhood Vy¡i of y¡i such that ui(xi;x0
¡i) ¸ ui(xi;y¡i) ¡ ², for all x0
¡i 2 Vy¡i.
COROLLARY 5.1 [Monteiro and Page (2007)] If a game G = (Xi;ui)i2I is compact, bounded,
separable metric, uniformly payoff secure, and has reciprocally upper semicontinuous payoffs,
then it possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Nessah and Tian (2008) introduce the concept of uniform transfer continuity, and show that if
a game G = (Xi; ui)i2I is uniformly transfer continuous, then the mixed extension G is weakly
transfer continuous.
DEFINITION 5.2 The game G is said to be uniformly transfer continuous if for every player
i 2 I, every xi 2 Xi, and every ² > 0, there is a strategy xi 2 Xi such that for every y¡i 2 X¡i,
there exists a neighborhood V(xi;y¡i) of (xi;y¡i) such that
ui(xi;x0
¡i) + ² ¸ ui(xi;y¡i) ¸ ui(z) ¡ ²; for all z 2 V(xi;y¡i):
26COROLLARY 5.2 [Nessah and Tian (2008)] If a game G = (Xi;ui)i2I is compact, bounded,
Hausdorff, anduniformlytransfercontinuous, thenitpossessesamixedstrategyNashequilibrium.
We now provide a full characterization on the existence of symmetric mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium for quasi-symmetric games. For the following result only, let M0 denote the common
set of mixed strategies for each player i.
Deﬁne an extended quasi-symmetric function ¹ Ã : M0 £ M0 ! R by
Ã(º;¹) = ui(¹;:::;º;:::;¹): (5)
Since ¹ G is quasi-symmetric, ¹¤ is a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if
¹ Ã(º;¹¤) · ¹ Ã(¹¤;¹¤) for all º 2 M0.
THEOREM 5.2 Suppose that G = (Mi;ui)i2I is a compact, quasi-symmetric, and Hausdorff
game. Then G possesses a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if its mixed
extension payoff ¹ Ã(º;¹) deﬁned by (4) is recursively diagonal transfer continuous on M0.
This result covers Corollary 5.3 of Reny (1999) as a special case.
6 Full Characterization of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we provide a full characterization of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in an ex ante
formulationofaBayesiangame, inwhicheachplayer’sbeliefsarecommonprior. Theexistenceof
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this formulation has been studied by Radner and Rosenthal (1982),
Milgrom and Weber (1985), Vives (1990), and Zandt and Vives (2007). The full characterization
of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in an interim or incomplete-information formulation of a Bayesian
game studied by Van Zandt (2007) can be similarly investigated.
Let the strategy spaces be compact subsets of topological spaces and Ti the set of types of
player i, a non-empty complete separable metric space. Denote by T the Cartesian product of the
sets of types of the players, T =
Q
i2I Ti. The common beliefs of the players are represented by
¹, a probability measure on the Borel subsets of T. The measure ¹i will represent the marginal on
T. The payoff to player i is given by ui : X £ T ! R, Borel measurable and bounded. A (pure)
strategy for player i is a (Borel measurable) map ®i : Ti ! Xi that assigns an action to every
possible type of the player. Let §i(¹i) denote the strategy space of player i when we identify






27be the expected payoff to player i when agent j uses strategy ¾j, j 2 I.
A strategy ¾¤ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a game if
¦i(¾¤) = ¦i(¾i;¾¤
¡i) 8¾i 2 §i:
There are several results available in the literature on the existence of pure strategy equilibria
in Bayesian games [e.g. Radner and Rosenthal (1982), Milgrom and Weber (1985), and Vives
(1990)].
As a direct corollary of Theorem 3.1, the following result strictly generalizes all the existing
results on the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
THEOREM 6.1 Suppose a Bayesian-Nash game ¡ = (§i; ¦i)i2I is compact. Then it possesses
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if ¦i is recursively diagonal transfer continuous on X.
This theorem strictly generalizes the existing results such as those in Ray and Rosenthal
(1982), Milgrom and Weber (1985), Vives (1990), Athey (2001), Reny (2006), Van Zandt (2007),
and Zandt and Vives (2008) as special cases.
7 Economic Applications
The approach and main result developed in the paper can also allow us to ascertain the existence of
equilibria in important classes of economic games. As an application, in this section, we show how
they can be employed to fully characterize the existence of competitive (or Walrasian) equilibrium
for a certain class of economies.
One of the great achievements of economic theory in the last sixty years is the general equilib-
rium theory. The proof of the existence of a competitive equilibrium is generally considered one
of the most important and robust results of economic theory. There are many different ways of
establishing the existence of competitive equilibria, including the “excess demand approach” by
showing that there is a price at which excess demand can be non-positive.
The signiﬁcance of such an approach lies partly in the fact that demand and/or supply may not
be continuous or even not be necessarily derived from proﬁt maximizing behavior of price taking
ﬁrms, but is determined by prices in completely different ways. It is well known that Walrasian
equilibrium precludes the existence of an equilibrium in the presence of increasing returns to
scale and assumes price-taking and proﬁt-maximizing behavior. Some other alternative pricing
rules then have been proposed such as loss-free, average cost, marginal cost, voluntary trading,
and quantity-taking pricing rules in the presence of increasing returns to scale or more general
types of non-convexities— cf. Beato (1982), Bonnisseau and Cornet (1990), Quinzii(1992), Tian
28(2009) and the references therein. There is a large literature on the existence results using the
excess demand approach, such as those in Gale (1955), Nikaido (1956, 1968, 1970), Debreu
(1970, 1974, 1982), Sonnenschein (1972, 1973), Hildenbrand (1974), Hildenbrand and Kirman
(1975), Grandmont (1977), Neuefeind (1980), Aliprantis and Brown (1983), H¨ usseinov (1999),
Momi(2003), Quah (2008), etc.
We provide a complete solution to the existence of competitive equilibrium in economies with
general excess demand functions,7 in which commodities may be indivisible and excess demand
functions may be discontinuous or do not have any structure except Walras’ law. We introduce
a condition, called recursive transfer lower semi-continuity, which is necessary and sufﬁcient for
the existence of general equilibrium in such economies. Thus, our result strictly generalizes all
the existing results on the existence of equilibrium in economies with excess demand functions.
Let ¢ be the closed L ¡ 1 dimensional unit simplex deﬁned by




pl = 1g; (7)
and let ^ z(¢) : ¢ ! RL [ f§1g denote the excess demand function of some economy. A
very important property of excess demand function is Walras’ law, which can take either of the
following two forms. The strong form of Walras’ law is given by
p ¢ ^ z(p) = 0 for all p 2 ¢;
and the weak form of Walras’ law is given by
p ¢ ^ z(p) · 0 for all p 2 ¢:
A price vector p¤ is a competitive or Walrasian equilibrium if ^ z(p¤) · 0.
The equilibrium price problem is to ﬁnd a price vector p which clears the markets for all
commodities (i.e., the excess demand functions ^ z(p) · 0 for the free disposal equilibrium price
or ^ z(p) = 0) under the assumption of Walras’ law.
We say that price p upsets price q if p gives a higher value to q’s excess demand, i.e. p¢ ^ z(q) >
q ¢ ^ z(q) > 0.
DEFINITION 7.1 (Recursive Upset Pricing) Let ^ z(¢) : ¢ ! RL [ f§1g be an excess demand
function. We say that a non-equilibrium price vector p0 2 ¢ is recursively upset by p 2 ¢ if there
exists a ﬁnite set of price vectors fp1;p2;:::;pg such that p1 ¢ ^ z(p0) > 0, p2 ¢ ^ z(p1) > 0, :::,
p ¢ ^ z(pm¡1) > 0.
7In the case of strictly convex preferences and production sets, we obtain excess demand functions rather than
correspondences.
29In words, a non-equilibrium price vector p0 is recursively upset by p means that there exist
ﬁnite upsetting price vectors p1;p2;:::;pm with pm = p such that p0’s excess demand is not
affordable at p1, p1’s excess demand is not affordable at p2, and pm¡1’s excess demand is not
affordable at pm. When the strong form of Walras’ law holds, this implies that p0 is upset by p1,
p1 is upset by p2, ..., pm¡1 is upset by p.
DEFINITION 7.2 (Recursive Transfer Lower Semi-Continuity) An excess demand function ^ z(¢) :
¢ ! RL [ f§1g is said to be recursively transfer lower semi-continuous on ¢ if, whenever
q 2 ¢ is not a competitive equilibrium price vector, there exists some price p0 2 ¢ (possibly
p0 = q) and a neighborhood Vq such that p ¢ ^ z(Vq) > 0 for any p that recursively upsets p0.
Roughly speaking, recursive transfer lower semi-continuity of ^ z(¢) means that, whenever q is
not a competitive equilibrium price vector, there exists another non-competitive equilibrium price
vector p0 such that all excess demands in some neighborhood of q are not affordable at any price
vector p that recursively upsets p0. This implies that, if a competitive equilibrium fails to exist,
then there is some non-equilibrium price vector q such that for every other price vector p0 and
every neighborhood of q, excess demand of some price vector q0 in the neighborhood becomes
affordable at price vector p that recursively upsets p0.
REMARK 7.1 While continuity does not imply nor is implied by recursive diagonal transfer con-
tinuity, recursive transfer lower semi-continuity is weaker than lower semi-continuity. Indeed,
when ^ z(¢) is lower semi-continuous, p ¢ ^ z(¢) is also lower semi-continuous for any nonnegative
vector p, and thus we have pm ¢ ^ z(q0) > 0 for all q0 2 N(q) and p 2 ¢.
Now we have the following theorem that strictly generalizes all the existing results on the ex-
istence of competitive equilibrium in economies that have single-valued excess demand functions.
THEOREM 7.1 Suppose an excess demand function ^ z(¢) : ¢ ! RL [ f§1g satisﬁes either of
the two forms of Walras’ law. Then there exists a competitive price equilibrium p¤ 2 ¢ if and only
if ^ z(¢) is recursively transfer lower semi-continuous on ¢.
PROOF. Sufﬁciency ((). Deﬁne a function Á : ¢£¢ ! < by Á(p;q) = p¢^ z(p) for p;q 2 ¢.
Since p ¢ ^ z(q) > 0 and q ¢ ^ z(q) · 0 for all p 2 ¢ by Walras’ law, we have Á(p;q) > Á(q;q) for
all p;q 2 ¢. Then, by recursive transfer lower semi-continuity of ^ z(¢), Á is recursively diagonal
transfer continuous on ¢.8 Thus, by the sufﬁciency of Theorem 3.1, there exists p¤ 2 ¢ such
8The reverse may not be true under the weak form of Walras’ law. However, when the strong form of Walras’ law
holds, ^ z is recursively transfer lower semi-continuous if and only if Á is recursively diagonal transfer continuous.
30that p ¢ ^ z(p¤) = Á(p;p¤) · Á(p¤;p¤) · 0 for all p 2 ¢. Letting p1 = (1;0;:::;0), p2 =
(0;1;0;:::;0), and pL = (0;0;:::;0;1), we have ^ zl(p¤) · 0 for l = 1;:::;L and thus p¤ is a
competitive price equilibrium.
Necessity ()). Suppose p¤ is a competitive price equilibrium and p ¢ ^ z(q) > 0 for q;p 2 ¢.
Let p0 = p¤ and N(q) be a neighborhood of q. Since p ¢ ^ z(p¤) · 0 for all p 2 ¢, it is impossible
to ﬁnd any sequence of ﬁnite price vectors fp1;p2;:::;pmg such that p1 ¢ ^ z(p0) > 0;p2 ¢ ^ z(p1) >
0;:::;pm ¢ ^ z(pm¡1) > 0 . Hence, the recursive transfer lower semi-continuity holds trivially.
8 Conclusion
The existing results only give sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of equilibrium, and no com-
plete solution to the question of the existence of equilibrium in general games has been given in
the literature. This paper ﬁlls this gap by providing a full characterization of equilibrium in games
with arbitrary strategy spaces and payoffs. We fully characterize the existence of pure strategy
Nash equilibrium in games with general topological strategy spaces that may be discrete, contin-
uum or non-convex and payoff functions that may be discontinuous or do not have any form of
quasi-concavity. We establish a condition, called recursive diagonal transfer continuity, which is
both necessary and sufﬁcient for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with
arbitrary compact strategy spaces and payoffs. As such, it strictly generalizes all the existing
theorems on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Recursive diagonal transfer conti-
nuity also permits full characterization results on the existence of symmetric pure strategy, mixed
strategy Nash, and Bayesian Nash equilibria in games with general strategy spaces and payoffs.
As an application of our approach and main result, we also fully characterizes the existence of
competitive equilibrium for economies with excess demand functions.
We end the paper by remarking that characterization results are mainly for the purpose of iden-
tifying whether or not a game has an equilibrium, but not whether it is easy to check. Recursive
diagonal transfer continuity provides a way of understanding equilibrium, more than necessarily
providing a way to check its existence. Even so, in the paper, we use many known economic
examples to illustrate that it is useful to employ recursive diagonal transfer continuity to check the
existence of equilibrium, especially the nonexistence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Never-
theless, Nessah and Tian (2008) develop some very weak sufﬁcient conditions that are relatively
easy to check and generalize most of the existing results for the existence of equilibrium in dis-
continuous games. A potential future work may be attempted to ﬁnd ways of applying recursive
diagonal transfer continuity as a useful tool for establishing equilibrium.
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